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ALL OR NOTHING: THE SUPREME COURT
ANSWERS THE QUESTION "WHAT'S IN A
NAME?"
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 S.
Ct. 2451 (2004)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Nevada
Revised Statute (NRS) Section 171.123.1 This statute required an
individual to identify himself in response to a police officer's inquiry, or
face arrest. 2 Petitioner argued that his arrest pursuant to Section 171.123
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and deprived him of the Fifth Amendment's protections
against self-incrimination. The Court, after balancing the intrusion on
petitioner's rights against the legitimate government interests served by the
search, reiterated that questions concerning a suspect's identity are
permitted during an investigative stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio; it then held
that petitioner could be compelled to answer the inquiry.4 The Court also
held that the requirement of the Nevada statute did not violate petitioner's
Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination because
"disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination."
5
This Note first argues that the Hiibel Court wrongly decided
petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim. In Hiibel, the Court determined the
reasonableness of the search by balancing the individual's right to be free
from intrusion against the legitimate government interests promoted by the
search. Accepting the Court's own test, however, petitioner's arrest for
refusal to identify himself under Section 117.123 was unconstitutional. The
1 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461
(2004).
2 NEv. REv. STAT. 171.123 (2003).
3 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
4 Id. at 2458-59.
' Id. at 2460.
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minimal government interest served by the requirement for identification
was outweighed by the breach of Hiibel's right to be secure in his person
"against unreasonable searches and seizures."6
Secondly, this Note argues that a person's identity may indeed be
incriminating evidence; thus, the Court wrongly held that petitioner's arrest
pursuant to Section 117.123 did not violate his Fifth Amendment right to be
free from self-incrimination. While seeking to justify the constitutionality
of the statute with regard to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the
Court made two mutually exclusive arguments, which call into question the




Hiibel is the latest in a line of cases interpreting the scope of the law
enforcement stops permitted by the Court in Terry v. Ohio.7 In the nearly
forty years since Terry, the Court has set forth a test for determining
whether a particular action by law enforcement in connection with a Terry
stop violates the Fourth Amendment: whether the intrusion upon the
individual's rights is justified by the countervailing government interest
implicated by the intrusion.
8
1. Terry v. Ohio
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 9 In Terry v. Ohio, the Court addressed
whether a police officer had violated the suspects' Fourth Amendment
rights when he, lacking probable cause, patted down suspects in a search for
weapons.
In that case, a police officer noticed three suspicious individuals
milling about the front of a store. 10 Concerned that they were planning a
robbery, and fearing that they were armed, the officer stopped them and
6 Id. at 2459.
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8 See U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50
(1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
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patted them down.1 During the search, he discovered that two of the men
had pistols, and he placed each under arrest.12 At trial, the defendants made
a motion to suppress the guns as evidence, which the trial court denied.
13
The county court of appeals affirmed, and the Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal. 14 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the conviction.'
5
The Court held that a law enforcement official lacking probable cause
can, for the protection of himself and others, conduct a limited search of a
suspect's outer clothing in order to discover weapons, when he has
observed conduct that leads him to believe that the person stopped may be
armed and dangerous.' 6 The relevant standard is "reasonable suspicion;"
the police officer must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts"
combined with the inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, which
create reasonable suspicion. 17 The Court acknowledged that the protections
of the Fourth Amendment do not cease once an individual leaves the home,
but are fully available to the citizen on the street. 18 In addition, it was held
that an individual is "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when
a police officer restricts his freedom to walk away, 19 and that the
exploration of the exterior of a person's clothing constitutes a "search. 20
The key issue in the case was whether there was justification for the
officer's intrusion upon petitioners' rights.2' In the Court's view, the
Fourth Amendment was implicated every time a public agent intruded upon
an individual's personal security, and the scope of the intrusion was central
to the determination of reasonableness.22 In order to justify an intrusion
upon "constitutionally protected interests," the governmental interests at
stake must outweigh those being encroached upon.23 In addition, the Court
held that the search and seizure in question were "reasonably related in
scope to the justification for their initiation," and the resulting evidence
" Id. at 7.
12 id.
13 Id. at 7-8.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 30-31.
7 Id. at21.
18 Id. at 8-9.
'9 Id. at 16.
20 Id. at 17.
21 Id. at 23.
22 Id. at 19 n.15.
23 Id. at 21.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
could therefore be admitted without violating petitioners' Fourth
Amendment rights.24
The Court justified the search and seizure by pointing to the
governmental interests at stake, not least of which was the officer's personal
and immediate interest in his own safety.25 The Court cited the tradition of
armed violence by the country's criminals, often directed toward law
enforcement officers, as evidence that the search was necessary for the
officer's protection. Although the Court allowed the search and seizure in
these narrow circumstances, it refused to further "develop ... the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure
and search for weapons." '27
In his concurrence, Justice White wrote in order to clarify the scope
and purpose of the holding.28 Justice White acknowledged that nothing
precludes a police officer from posing questions to anyone on the street, and
that given the proper circumstances, as in Terry, an individual may be
detained while such questions are asked.29 "Of course, the person stopped
is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to
answer furnishes no basis for an arrest. 3°
2. Subsequent Development of Terry's Fourth Amendment Standard
The following term, in Davis v. Mississippi, the Court held that
fingerprint evidence obtained during an illegal search under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments should have been excluded at trial.31 In the course
of reaching this conclusion, the Court criticized the State for relying on
cases which approve "general questioning of citizens" during investigation
of a potential crime.32 By its own admission, the Court's statements in
these cases "merely reiterated the settled principle that while the police
have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning
unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.,
33
24 Id. at 29; see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
25 Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24. Central to the Court's determination of the police officer's
individual interests in his own safety were statistics describing the number of officers killed
in the line of duty by weapons, and the ready availability to criminals of firearms. See id. at
24 n.21.
26 Id. at 23-24.
27 Id. at 29.
28 Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
29 Id. (White, J., concurring).
30 Id. (White, J., concurring).
31 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969).
32 Id. at 727 n.6.
33 Id.
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Ten years later, in Brown v. Texas,34 two police officers, cruising in
their patrol car, had observed one man walking away from another in an
alley known for its heavy drug traffic. One of the officers testified that the
man was stopped because the situation "looked suspicious," although the
officers did not suspect him of any specific misconduct.36  When
approached, the suspect refused to identify himself, and was arrested for
violation of a Texas statute which criminalized such refusal during a lawful
stop.37 The statute read in relevant part: "A person commits an offense if he
intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and
residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and
requested the information.
' 38
The Court held that when the officers detained the person for the
purpose of obtaining his identity, they had seized him for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. 39 The Court, consistent with its analysis in Terry,
sought to determine the search's reasonability by balancing the public's
interest in preventing crime against the individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures; 40 this test required that a seizure be
justified by "specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or ... a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of the individual
officers. ' 41 However, the Court found that the arrest was not based on
objective criteria-the suspicion had been a baseless hunch-and therefore
the Texas statute had been improperly applied to appellant.42 It refrained
from deciding "whether an individual may be punished for refusing to
identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies
Fourth Amendment requirements. 43
The Court went on to hold, in Kolender v. Lawson, that a California
statute requiring a suspect to provide "credible and reliable" identification
under the threat of arrest was unconstitutionally vague under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment.4  In his concurrence, Justice
Brennan reiterated that brief seizures permitted by Terry must still be
14 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
35 Id. at 48-49.
36 Id. at 49.
37 TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974); Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.
38 § 38.02(a).
39 Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
40 Id. at 50-51.
41 Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1997)).
42 Id. at 53.
43 Id. at 53 n.3.
44 461 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1983).
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"strictly circumscribed" to limit intrusiveness,45 and described several
characteristics of such seizures, including, "most importantly, the suspect
must be free to leave after a short time and to decline to answer the
questions put to him.
46
A year later, the Court indirectly addressed the issue of whether
suspects could be required to answer the questions posed to them by law
enforcement officers. 47 In dicta accompanying the Court's decision in
Berkemer v. McCarty-a case interpreting the scope of Miranda
protections-Justice Marshall wrote that an officer did have the ability to
ask a suspect a "moderate number" of questions in order to ascertain his
identity for the purpose of confirming or assuaging the officer's
suspicions.48  However, "the detainee is not obliged to respond. And,
unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to
arrest him, he must then be released.
49
Shortly thereafter, the Court held in United States v. Hensley ° that a
police officer, in addition to being able to stop an individual suspected of a
previously committed crime under the circumstances delineated in Terry,
could also check that person's identification in the absence of probable
cause.5 ' In that case, the suspect was wanted for a bank robbery, and was
stopped by police on the basis of a "wanted flyer" issued by a neighboring
jurisdiction which had a reasonable suspicion based on specific and
articulable facts.52  While they awaited confirmation from a dispatcher
regarding a warrant for respondent's arrest, two officers who were familiar
with the flyer pulled respondent over and asked him and his passenger to
step out of the car.53 Upon doing so, one of the officers spotted a revolver
sticking out from beneath the seat.54 Both men were arrested.55 The Court
found that the stop was within the parameters set forth by Terry, and that
the reasonable suspicion "justified the length and intrusiveness of the
stop. 56 Again, the Court weighed the government's interests against the
constitutional rights of the individual. The Court concluded that "the ability
45 Id. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
48 Id. at 439.
49 Id. at 439-40.
0 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
I' d. at 229.
52 Id. at 232.
53 Id. at 224.
54 id.
" Id. at 225.
56 Id. at 235.
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to... check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the
strong governmental interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to
justice," and that those interests outweighed those of the individual.1
7
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 5 8 In
order to qualify for this protection, a communication must have three
characteristics: it must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.5 9
The communication of an accused is testimonial when it "explicitly or
implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information.
' 60
However, the Court had held that a suspect could be compelled to provide a
662 63sample of his blood,6 1 handwriting, or voice without implicating the
protections of the Fifth Amendment because these actions were not
testimonial. These communications were not testimonial because the
suspect's compelled disclosures did not constitute "the contents of his own
mind"64 or "knowledge he might have., 65 On the other hand, actions are
not as a class excluded from being testimonial--"'the act of production'
itself may implicitly communicate 'statements of fact.',,6 6 Most recently,
the Court held in the context of Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
that the term "testimonial" covers responses to police interrogations, if
nothing else.67
A communication that is both compelled and testimonial must also be
incriminating in order to invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment.68
The Court has held that a communication was incriminating when there was
a real and appreciable danger of incrimination: a danger greater than "some
extraordinary and barely possible contingency., 69 In addition, the witness
must reasonably believe that the information divulged could either be used
"' Id. at 229.
58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966).
59 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-36 (2000).
60 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
61 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
62 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
63 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).
64 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
65 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
66 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).
67 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
68 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37-38.
69 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (internal quotations omitted).
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to prosecute him, or lead to evidence which could be used in such a
prosecution. 70  Hence, the privilege may be invoked when an individual
reasonably believes that his answers will "furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute" him.71
Prior case law, therefore, left the issues at stake in Hiibel well-defined,
yet undecided. A law enforcement officer could stop an individual
suspected of a crime based upon reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause, and had the ability to request identification from the suspect. 72 The
Court had stated-although not directly held-that the suspect was free to
decline that request.
C. CAREY V. NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BOARD
The Ninth Circuit had previously ruled on the constitutionality of the
statute in question in Hiibel, NRS Section 171.123. In Carey v. Nevada
Gaming Control Board,73 the Ninth Circuit held the statute to be
unconstitutional when applied to an individual who refused to identify
himself after being arrested at a casino on suspicion of cheating.74 The
court found that the Nevada Gaming Control Board Agent had lawfully
detained Carey in accordance with Terry.75 However, the court's previous
holding in Lawson v. Kolender76-that compelling an individual to identify
themselves violated the Fourth Amendment-remained controlling in the
circuit, and therefore Carey's arrest under the statute was held to violate his
Fourth Amendment rights.77 The Ninth Circuit supported its holding by
reasoning that "the serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the
mere possibility that identification might provide a link leading to arrest."
78
70 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
71 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
72 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 n.6 (1969); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
73 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002).
74 Id. at 876, 881.
71 Id. at 880.
76 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The Supreme Court later
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, but declined to review the Ninth Circuit's holding that NRS Section 171.123 violated
the Fourth Amendment. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1983).
77 Carey, 279 F.3d at 880.
78 Id. (quoting Lawson, 658 F.2d at 1366-67)
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III. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
79
On the evening of May 21, 2000, the Humboldt County, Nevada,
sheriffs department responded to a tip reporting that a man was assaulting
a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. ° Deputy
Lee Dove was informed of the incident by police dispatch, and drove to
investigate.81 Upon arrival, Deputy Dove spoke with the caller, who
directed him toward a truck parked on the side of the road.82 As he
approached the truck, Dove observed skid marks in the gravel leading to the
truck, which suggested that it had been parked very suddenly.83 He saw
Larry D. Hiibel standing outside the truck, and observed Hiibel's
seventeen-year-old daughter inside the cab.84 Dove approached Hiibel and
told him he was investigating a report of a fight8 5 Dove believed him to be
intoxicated based on the appearance of his eyes, his odor, his speech, and
his mannerisms, and asked him to produce identification. 6
Hiibel refused and asked Dove why he needed identification.8 7 Dove
informed Hiibel that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see
his identification. 88 At that point, Hiibel became upset and insisted that he
had done nothing wrong.8 9 "The officer explained that he wanted to find
out who the man was and what he was doing there."90 As he continued to
request identification, and Hiibel continued to refuse to produce it (a total of
eleven times), Hiibel placed his hands behind his back and challenged the
deputy to arrest him.91 Deputy Dove described the situation in his report of
the incident:
79 The police videotape of the stop can be found at www.papersplease.org/hiibel/
video.html.
80 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455
(2004).
81 Id.
82 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of the State of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev.
2002), aff'd, 124 S.Ct. 2451 (2004).
83 Id.
84 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455; HiUbel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
81 Hibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
86 HiUbel, 59 P.3d at 1203.






During my conversation with Mr. Hiibel, there was a point where he became
somewhat agressive [sic].
I felt based on me not being able to find out who he was, to identify him, I didn't
know if he was wanted or what is [sic] situation was, I wasn't able to determine what
was going on crimewise in the vehicle, based on that I felt he was intoxicated, and
how he was becoming aggressive and moody, I went ahead and put him in handcuffs
so I could secure him for my safety, and put him in my patrol vehicle.
92
Hiibel was arrested and charged with violating NRS Section 199.280,
"willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in discharging
or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office," as well as a
misdemeanor domestic battery. The government reasoned that his
violation of Section 199.280 was premised on his violation of NRS Section
171.123(3): refusing to identify himself to a police officer.94
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Trial Court
At trial in the Justice Court of Union Township, the court found that
by refusing to identify himself as required by Section 171.123(3) Hiibel had
"obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge
his duty."95  He was convicted for violation of Section 199.280 (the
domestic battery charge was dismissed) and fined $250.96
2. Sixth Judicial District Court
Hiibel appealed to the district court, contending that his arrest pursuant
to Section 171.123 violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 97 The
court affirmed the conviction, holding that it was "reasonable and
necessary" for Deputy Dove to request Hiibel's identification. 98 The district
court considered evidence beyond Hiibel's failure to identify himself in
justifying his arrest and conviction, including his apparent intoxication and
the corresponding possibility that he had been driving under the influence. 99
The court also balanced the public interests against the individual interests
92 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of the State of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev.
2002).
93 Id.; Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
94 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
'5 Id. at 2456.
96 Id.
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at stake in the case and concluded that the public's interest in Dove's
safety-to which it was "crucial... to know the identity of a person
suspected of battery, domestic violence, and driving under the influence"-
outweighed Hiibel's interests in not identifying himself. 0 0
3. Supreme Court of Nevada
The Supreme Court of Nevada, after concluding that its jurisdiction
was proper and that the constitutionality of NRS Section 171.123 was an
issue of first impression, went on to address the merits of Hiibel's appeal.10'
It noted that the general issue at stake-whether a person reasonably
suspected of a crime may be required to identify himself-remained
unresolved (and the subject of a circuit split),10 2 as it had been twice passed
on by the United States Supreme Court. 10 3 The court announced that it
would undertake "an independent analysis of the constitutionality" of NRS
Section 171.123.104
The decision began by stating that the right "to wander freely and
anonymously" and the "'right to be let alone' - to simply live in privacy"
are sacred and are afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment.10
However, the court wrote, these rights include limitations-chief among
them reasonableness. 10 6 Indeed, the reasonableness of an intrusion into an
individual's privacy has been the key question in cases implicating the
Fourth Amendment, and it was in this case as well. 10 7 On the side of the
public interest, the court considered "the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, [and] the degree to which the seizure advances" those
interests; on the other side of the scale was "the severity of the interference
with individual liberty."'0 8
10 Id. at 1203-04.
'o' Id. at 1204.
102 See id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had, in Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179,
1190 (10th Cir. 2000), upheld a Utah statute requiring individuals to identify themselves
during investigatory stops, whereas the Ninth Circuit, in Carey v. Nevada Gaming Board,
279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2002), held NRS Section 171.123 to violate the Fourth
Amendment.
103 Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1204.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....").
107 Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1204-05.
10 Id. at 1205.
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The court concluded that, when weighed against the intrusion allowed
by the statute, the evidence was "overwhelming" in favor of the public's
interest in requiring individuals to identify themselves to police officers. 0 9
The primary evidence cited in favor of the public's interest was the danger
faced by law enforcement officers in the line of duty-particularly in the
course of an investigative stop. 10 The court took judicial notice that in
2000, fifty-one officers were murdered in the line of duty, including thirteen
murdered during traffic stops or pursuits, twelve during arrests, and six
during investigations of suspicious persons.1'1 The court reasoned that
some of those incidents may have been avoided if the officers had been able
to determine the identity and criminal history of their attackers, for
"knowing the identity of a suspect allows officers to more accurately
evaluate and predict potential dangers that may arise during an investigative
stop.""12  A police officer must be allowed to protect himself from an
individual when he has reasonable suspicion that the individual has
committed a crime, and obtaining the suspect's identity is essential to that
protection, according to the court.' 13 In addition, there are other situations
where the state has an interest in requiring identification from suspects: a
sex offender loitering outside a daycare center, the enforcement of
restraining orders, the enforcement of curfews, and perhaps the most
compelling policy, the challenge of defending the nation against
terrorism. 1
4
In closing, the majority reiterated that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are not absolute; they are limited by "principles of policy"
when those policies become important enough to outweigh the individual
rights, as they had in this case. 115 Aside from the promotion of these
policies, the court concluded that the requirements of the statute were
reasonable, pointing out that "we reveal our names in a variety of situations
every day without much consideration"-when one introduces oneself to
others or disseminates one's name through credit card transactions, checks,
and business cards-not to mention the gauntlet of security faced by airline
passengers each day. 1 6 A name, according to the court, is "neutral and






114 Id. at 1205-06.
1" Id. at 1206.
116 id.
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ultimately reasonable intrusion. 17 Thus, the court held that Deputy Dove
had acted reasonably when, based on the sum of his observations, he
repeatedly asked Hiibel to identify himself and, faced with repeated refusals
and challenges to arrest Hiibel, Dove proceeded to do so. 118 The court
concluded that the application of Section 171.123 to Hiibel's case did not
violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
1 9
Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, in order to obtain resolution of his
Fifth Amendment claim.120 The Nevada Supreme Court denied the petition
without opinion.121 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to decide whether the application of Section 171.123 to Hiibel's case
violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 22
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S OPINION
After tracing the history and development of so-called "stop and
identify" statutes, the majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy,
123
found that the Nevada statute was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and did not compel self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 124  The Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis by
observing that "asking questions is an essential part of police
investigations., 125 It asserted that interrogation relating to one's identity
does not automatically implicate the Fourth Amendment, 126 and since Terry,
it has recognized that when a law enforcement officer has reasonable
suspicion that a person has been, is, or is about to be involved in criminal
activity, the officer can stop that individual and take reasonable steps to
investigate such activity.127  In fact, the Court wrote, its previous
decisions-particularly United States v. Hensley,128 Hayes v. Florida,129 and
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1207.
19 Id.




123 Id. at 2454. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
124 Id. at 2460-61.
125 Id. at 2458.
126 Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).
127 Id at 2458.
128 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
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Adams v. Williams 130-"make clear that questions concerning a suspect's
identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops."'131 The
required reasonableness is attained if the officer's measure is "justified at its
inception, and... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. 132
Justice Kennedy anticipated the balancing test previously employed by
the Supreme Court and applied by the lower courts to this case when he
pointed out that learning a suspect's identity serves several government
interests: informing the officer of the suspect's record of crime, violence, or
mental instability, and allowing an officer to either arrest a suspect or clear
his name. 133  The latter concern is particularly germane in domestic
violence cases such as this one, according to Justice Kennedy; officers
faced with such a situation "need to know whom they are dealing with in
order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible
danger to the potential victim.'
13 4
Next, the majority opinion set the stage for an examination of the
relevant precedent. Although the Court has established that an officer may
request identification during a Terry stop, it remains an "open question
whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to
answer. ' 135 Justice Kennedy also sought to preempt Hiibel's marshaling of
language found in previous cases 13 6 -such as Justice White's concurrence
in Terry137 and statements in Berkemer v. McCarty, where the Court stated
that an individual subject to a Terry stop had no obligation to respond to
questions. 138  Justice Kennedy dismissed these statements as not
controlling. 139 He supported the Berkemer Court's conclusion that because
the Fourth Amendment provides rights against the government as opposed
to obligations on the individual, the Fourth Amendment cannot compel a
suspect to answer questions. 14  However, Justice Kennedy noted, the case
at bar did not raise this issue, because the legal obligation arose out of the
129 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
130 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
131 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
132 Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))).
133 Id. at 2458.
134 Id.
'35 id.
136 Id. at 2458-59.
137 Terry, 392 U.S. at 34.
138 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
139 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
140 Id.
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Nevada statute, not the Fourth Amendment. 141 The obligation here was a
requirement to grant a law enforcement officer's request for
identification. 142 Because a state law was at issue, Kennedy reasoned, the
statements in Terry and Berkemer did not prohibit a state from requiring a
suspect to provide his name during a Terry stop.
143
This issue could only be decided through application of the test set
forth in Terry and its progeny: balancing the government's interest in
preventing crimes against the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights. 144 The Court wrote that NRS Section 171.123 satisfied
the reasonableness standard because "[t]he request for identity has an
immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a
Terry stop," and the threat of arrest and punishment encouraged obedience
without altering the duration or location of the stop. 145  The majority
acknowledged petitioner's argument that the Nevada statute allows the
police to make an arrest in the absence of probable cause, thereby
encouraging arbitrary police conduct, in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment. 146 However, the Court reasoned that this danger was avoided
by the requirement that the request for identification have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances surrounding the stop, 147 a requirement which it
held was met in the present case (with minimal justification, except a
characterization of the officer's inquiry as "commonsense"). 48 The Court
stated its holding generally: "A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his
name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth
Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 49
The majority proceeded to analyze Hiibel's next claim-that his arrest
for refusal to identify himself compelled him "to be a witness against
himself' in violation of the privileges accorded him by the Fifth
Amendment. 150 In order for a communication to implicate the Fifth
Amendment, it must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. 5 '








148 Id. at 2460.
149 Id. at 2459.
... U.S. CONST. amend. V; Hibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
"' Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460; see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-36
(2000).
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171.123 is nontestimonial, and therefore outside the scope of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court declined to decide that issue. 152 It did, however,
conclude that the communication at issue was not incriminating. 153 The
Court relied on its statement in Brown v. Walker that a claimant must show
a "reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being
compelled to answer' and such danger must be "'real and appreciable...
not a danger... so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to
influence his conduct.' 1 54 The Court then cited its development of this
standard in Kastigar,155 where it held that in order for the Fifth Amendment
privilege to be invoked, the compelled disclosure must be one that the
witnesses reasonably believe could either be used against him in a criminal
proceeding, or lead to further evidence which could be used in a
proceeding. 1
56
Applying these standards to the facts at hand, the Court found that
Hiibel had no "real and appreciable" fear that his identity would be used
against him in a criminal prosecution. 157 Instead, the Court concluded, the
reason for Hiibel's refusal was simple: "he thought his name was none of
the officer's business."' 158  According to the majority, Hiibel's "strong
belief' did not outweigh the legislature's conclusion that identifying oneself
was not incriminating for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
59
And although one's identity is unique, it is universal in the sense that
everyone has one, and thus its disclosure is "likely to be so insignificant in
the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances."' 60  Indeed, reasoned the majority, it is known in every
criminal proceeding who is being prosecuted, and "even witnesses who plan
to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are
called.' 16' The Court held out the possibility that a case may arise where
the requisite "unusual circumstances" exist so that one's identity may serve
to incriminate them, either directly or by providing "a link in the chain of
152 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
153 id.
154 Hibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896))
(internal quotations omitted).
155 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
156 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61-
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evidence."' 162 The present case was not such a situation, and the Court
accordingly deferred its decision.'
63
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens would have invalidated Hiibel's arrest because the
Nevada Statute compelled him to incriminate himself.
164
In my judgment, the broad constitutional right to remain silent, which derives from
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that '[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself is not as circumscribed as the Court
suggests and does not admit even of the narrow exception defined by the Nevada
statute.15
Justice Stevens began his analysis by appealing to statements made in
previous Supreme Court opinions. In Miranda v. Arizona,166 the Court
stated that the protections of the Fifth Amendment apply to "persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way
from being compelled to incriminate themselves.' '167  In Davis v.
Mississippi,16 it referred to the "settled principle" that "the police have the
right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning
unsolved crimes" but "have no right to compel them to answer.' ' 16 9 Justice
Stevens also pointed out that defendants at trial and unindicted targets of
grand jury investigations both receive protection under the Fifth
Amendment. 70  If these suspects who are the subject of criminal
investigations based on probable cause have the benefit of the Fifth
Amendment, Justice Stevens asked, should those being investigated based
upon mere suspicion not receive the same protections?' 71 Justice Stevens
went on to cite the Court's statements, which the majority characterized as
dicta, from Berkemer v. McCarty ("the detainee is not obliged to
respond") 172 and Justice White's concurrence in Terry ("Of course, the




164 Id. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
166 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
167 Id. at 467.
168 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
169 Id. at 727 n.6.
170 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S 420,439 (1984)).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring)).
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Justice Stevens then wrote that the communication at issue was a
testimonial one (a point the majority passed on deciding) and therefore met
that requirement for enjoyment of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 174 A
testimonial communication, according to Supreme Court precedent, is the
"'extortion of information from the accused,' the attempt to force him 'to
disclose the contents of his own mind."",175  The majority of verbal
statements meet this test, and although many physical acts are not protected
by the privilege, "in all instances, we have afforded Fifth Amendment
protection if the disclosure in question was being admitted because of its
content rather than some other aspect of the communication.' ' 176 Justice
Stevens reasoned that the statement at issue here-identification-was
"clearly testimonial," primarily because it was required in response to a
police officer's inquiry, and the Court had recently held that the term
"testimonial" applied "at a minimum.., to police interrogations."' 77 He
concluded that because police questioning during a Terry stop constitutes
interrogation, any required response is testimonial.
178
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for rushing past the issue of
whether the communication in this case was testimonial in order to decide
that it was not incriminating, a holding with which he disagreed.179 He
argued that with regard to incrimination, the Court has afforded "protection
to statements that are 'incriminating' in a much broader sense" than the
majority would admit. 180 The accepted meaning of "incriminating" in the
Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence had been any disclosure that
"could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.''
Applying this definition of "incriminating" to the facts at hand, Justice
Stevens found that the Fifth Amendment protected petitioner from being
compelled to identify himself under Section 171.123.182 He took issue with
the Court's statement that disclosure of Hiibel's identity would not
necessarily be used to incriminate him or lead to incriminating evidence.
183
174 Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)).
176 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354
(2004)).
178 Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 41, 445
(1972)).
182 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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If this were the case, "Why else would an officer ask for it?" And "why else
would the Nevada Legislature require its disclosure only when
circumstances 'reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a crime'?' ' 184 Justice Stevens argued that
if one were to accept the majority's construction-that identification of a
suspect is not incriminating-then petitioner did nothing to impede a police
investigation under NRS Section 199.280, he should never have been
arrested, and the statute's requirement is rendered "nothing more than a
useless invasion of privacy.' 85  Justice Stevens reasoned that, to the
contrary, the intent of the Nevada Legislature must have been to create for
its officers a useful mechanism for investigating suspicious circumstances,
and therefore "the very existence of the statute demonstrates the value of
the information it demands."'
' 86
According to Justice Stevens, divulging one's identity falls into the
category-held to be protected in Hubbell-of being incriminating "even if
the [name] itself is not inculpatory.' ' 187  Practically speaking, providing
one's name can be useful in the hands of a police officer with access to a
computerized law enforcement database, "and that information, in turn, can
be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution."' 88  The dissent
concluded that the majority erred when it suggested that the revelation of
one's identity would only rarely be incriminating. 189 Instead, petitioner
"acted well within his rights when he opted to stand mute."'190
C. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Justice Breyer argued that any law which compels a response to police
questioning during a Terry stop-as Section 171.123 does-is invalidated
by the Court's Fourth Amendment precedent. 191 The dissent began by
outlining the Court's opinion in Terry.192 Justice Breyer also cited Justice
White's statement in his Terry concurrence that "refusal to answer furnishes
no basis for an arrest."'193 He went on to describe the Court's decision in
184 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38
(2000)).
188 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 2464 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg.
192 See id. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)).
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Brown v. Texas, in which the Court stated that it "need not decide the
matter" of whether one could be arrested for refusal to answer a police
officer's inquiries. 194 He then cited the Court's statement in Berkemer five
years later that a suspect was not obliged to answer an officer's questions.
95
He concluded his survey of Supreme Court precedent by referring to Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Kolender v. Lawson (a Terry suspect "must be
free to... decline to answer the questions put to him") 196 and the Court's
decision in Illinois v. Wardlow (referring to "the individual's right to go
about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police
questioning").
197
"This lengthy history," wrote Justice Breyer, "- of concurring
opinions, of references, and of clear explicit statements-means that the
Court's statement in Berkemer, while technically dicta, is the kind of strong
dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law.
And that law has remained undisturbed for more than twenty years."'198 He
continued, "[t]here is no good reason now to reject this generation-old
statement of the law."'
199
Justice Breyer then raised a policy objection to allowing a state to
compel identification during a Terry stop-it could be an administrative
nightmare.200 Could a state requiring identification also require an address
or a driver's license number?201 Would the police officer then be burdened
with "keep[ing] track of the constitutional answers? After all, answers to
any of these questions may, or may not, incriminate, depending on the
circumstances. 20 2
Justice Breyer also criticized the majority for acknowledging that a
name itself will sometimes provide the link necessary to provide evidence
needed for a conviction, while refusing to decide whether compelling
identification would be permissible in such a circumstance.20 3 This would
leave an investigating police officer in an awkward position: unsure of
whether his situation is one in which the suspect's identity is not
incriminating-and thus may be constitutionally compelled--or one in
194 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S 47, 53 (1979)).
195 Id. (Breyer, J.,,dissenting) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
196 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
197 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
198 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20 See id. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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which the identity might lead to incriminating evidence-a situation the
constitutionality of which the Court has refused to determine.20 4
Justice Breyer's dissent concluded that the majority had failed to
justify a change in the widely accepted precedent, set forth in Terry and
Berkemer, and had failed to show that the precedent had acted as an
impediment to the law enforcement community's execution of justice.2 °5
He "would not begin to erode a clear rule with special exceptions. 20 6
V. ANALYSIS
The Court erred in concluding that Hiibel's arrest pursuant to NRS
Section 171.123 was constitutionally permissible. The application of
Section 171.123-requiring a suspect to identify himself in response to a
police officer's inquiry-to petitioner's case violated both his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court discarded its Fourth Amendment precedent in finding that
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a result of his
arrest. The line of cases following Terry, compel the conclusion that a
citizen, even one suspected of criminal activity, is free to go about his
business or refuse to respond to a police officer's questions.20 7 Petitioner
was therefore denied the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the present
case.
The Court also erred by failing to extend to Hiibel the right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.20 8
Petitioner's identity was testimonial, compelled, and incriminating. His
name furnished the "link in a chain of evidence" which could have been
used to convict him.20 9 The Court seems to take solace in the fact that it
was not used for this purpose, but this myopic approach is fraught with
negative policy implications.210
204 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207 Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 9-10, Hiibel (No. 03-5554).
208 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2462 (Stevens, J. dissenting).




1. Supreme Court Precedent Prohibits Compelling a Suspect to Provide
Identification
In its 1968 opinion in Terry, the Court explicitly limited its holding
that pat-down searches based on reasonable suspicion were justified by
important government interests, refusing to further "develop... the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure
and search for weapons., 21' The separate concurrences by Justice White
212
and Justice Harlan,2 x3 though not binding, explicitly reject the
constitutionality of compelled identification during a Terry stop. One year
later, in a footnote to its decision in Davis v. Mississippi, a majority of the
Court characterized as "settled principle" the notion that although law
enforcement officers are free to ask questions of citizens, responding to
such a question was entirely voluntary, and police "have no right to compel
them to answer."
2 14
A decade and a half later, that principle remained settled, as evidenced
by majority opinions in Berkemer v. McCarty ("the detainee is not obliged
to respond") 215 and Florida v. Royer, where the Court set forth explicit and
narrow limits of time and degree for Terry stops, and wrote that although a
police officer is free to inquire of the suspect, the detainee "need not answer
any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at
all and may go on his way.', 21 6 Justice Brennan weighed in on the issue
again, concurring in Kolender v. Lawson ("the suspect must be free... to
decline to answer the questions put to him").217 As recently as 2000, the
majority in Illinois v. Wardlow (referring to "the individual's right to...
remain silent in the face of police questioning") reinforced this
conclusion.218
The dissenters in Hiibel supported this reading of Supreme Court
precedent. Justice Stevens cites Davis, Berkemer and the Terry
concurrences in support of the proposition that this is a settled question-
211 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
212 Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he person stopped is not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest ....").
213 Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[O]rdinarily the person addressed has an equal
right to ignore his interrogator and walk away ....").
214 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969).
215 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
216 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
217 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
218 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
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settled in direct opposition to the majority's holding.2 19 Justice Breyer,
citing Berkemer and Wardlow opinions as well as Justice Brennan's
Kolender concurrence, described this "undisturbed" line of persuasive
precedent as the type of language "that the legal community typically takes
as a statement of the law, and as such, should remain undisturbed.
220
The majority attempted to circumvent this mountain of persuasive
language. 221 The opinion distinguished between those previous statements,
which "recognize[d] that the Fourth Amendment does not impose
obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the
government,, 222 and the present case, arising out of the Nevada statute
rather than the Fourth Amendment.223 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment does
provide rights against the government, as the majority states.224 It provides
citizens with the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
regardless of whether they are mandated by state statute. 25
The majority must have sensed it was on weak ground here; neither of
the dissents thinks it consequential that "the source of the legal obligation
[arose] from Nevada state law. 226 The Court sought to bolster its dismissal
of its previous statements as irrelevant by pointing out that "the statutory
obligation does not go beyond answering an officer's request to disclose a
name." 227 The Court implied that the question "What is your name?," or an
accompanying request for physical identification have a special
constitutional status-a suspect can refuse to answer any question posed to
him by a police office except that one. The Court failed to support this
conclusion.
The majority strains to free itself from the strictures of precedent, but
the commonsense approach to interpreting the Court's previous statements
on this issue-the approach taken by the dissenters-is to take them at face
value: a suspect is free to refuse to answer any question posed to him by a
police officer, including questions about his identity. In reaching its
holding in Hiibel-that a statute compelling those stopped upon reasonable
suspicion to identify themselves in response does not violate the
219 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2462-
63 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221 See id. at 2459.
222 id.
223 -id
224 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
225 See id.
226 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
227 Id.
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individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from searches and
seizures-the Court clearly ignored its own precedent requiring the
opposite conclusion.
2. Compelling an Individual Detained Pursuant to a Terry Stop to Identify
Himself Violates His Fourth Amendment Right to Be Free from
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Even if one ignores nearly forty years of statements, dicta, and
holdings, and grants that the Court should undertake its own independent
analysis of the constitutionality of NRS Section 171.123, one finds serious
flaws in the Court's reasoning. In the present case, the majority properly
sought to determine reasonableness by balancing the government's interest
in investigating potential criminal activity against the intrusion upon
Hiibel's Fourth Amendment rights.228 It simply misapplied the balancing
test to the facts at hand and thereby reached the wrong conclusion.
With regard to the first category to be balanced-the degree of
intrusion upon Hiibel's interests-the Court found the intrusion to be
minimal, because its requirement "has an immediate relation to the purpose,
rationale, and demands" of the stop.229 However, the Court's flawed and
occasionally circular reasoning in reaching this conclusion was an
abdication of its duty to properly apply the balancing test. Taken together,
the three propositions cited to support the reasonableness of the statute were
only marginally helpful to determining the degree of intrusiveness of the
seizure. Granted, the proposition that the request for identity is closely
related to the purpose of the stop satisfies one of the limits prescribed by the
Court in Terry,230 and the limited nature of the stop is probative (though not
determinative) of lessened intrusiveness. However, the Court's contention
that the threat of arrest prevents the request "from becoming a legal
nullity"231 is meaningless: the request should become a legal nullity if it
serves no governmental interest, and is therefore unconstitutional.
The Court's final statement in determining intrusiveness pointed out
that the statute's requirement altered neither the duration nor the location of
the stop.232 In fact, the statute's existence extended Hiibel's Terry stop by
several minutes at least (recall that Deputy Dove requested-and was
refused-Hiibel's identity eleven times before he placed Hiibel under
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
231 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
232 id
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arrest).233 Although the Court took extensive pains to minimize this
intrusion, it should not be taken lightly, for Justice Brandeis observed that
the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's "right to be let alone"-one
of the "most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."2 34 Even if one grants that the Court has established that the statute
requires only a minimum amount of intrusiveness, that intrusiveness must
still be weighed against the legitimate government interest promoted by the
extension of the Terry doctrine.
The application of the balancing test is made easier in this case
because of the absence of a legitimate government interest in requiring an
individual reasonably suspected of criminal activity to identify himself in
response to a police officer's request. The Court contended that there were
several governmental interests at stake in requiring an individual to identify
himself: an officer may discover that the suspect is wanted for other crimes
or, by the same token, may clear the suspect of any wrongdoing; in
domestic violence cases, officers "need to know whom they are dealing
with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and
possible danger to the potential victim. 235 However, Terry stops were set
forth as an exception to the probable cause requirement for the sole purpose
of preserving the safety of the investigating officer.2 36 The governmental
interests delineated by the majority in Hiibel impermissibly expand the
scope of Terry stops. There is no doubt that requiring suspects to identify
themselves in response to police inquiries would be a convenient rule for
'the law enforcement community. It would result in more arrests when those
individuals who are subject to a Terry stop are found to be wanted in
connection with another crime, and more efficient use of police time in
cases where those same individuals are cleared of criminal activity.
Convenience is not a compelling reason to infringe on an individual's
constitutional rights. The Court's contention that officers dealing with
domestic disturbances have a special need for the identity of those involved
is unfounded. Why do officers need this information? In what way could it
even make their jobs simpler, let alone serve an important government
interest? They do not need to know the names of those involved in order to
"assess the situation. 2 37 There are a host of other questions an officer
would also need answered in order to properly "assess a situation"-none
of which, the majority would presumably agree, anyone is obligated to
233 Id. at 2455.
234 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
235 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
131 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
237 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
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answer. Nor would knowing a suspect's identity lessen "the threat to their
own safety, 238 (this threat could be eliminated by conducting a pat down for
weapons, the degree of search allowed by Terry), or even ascertain
"possible danger to the potential victim. '239  Weapons threaten safety.
Names, taken alone, do not. Knowledge of a suspect's name by the
investigating officer furthers none of these objectives.
The Court ended up weighing the convenience to the law enforcement
community of obtaining a suspect's identity (the only legitimate
governmental interest at stake) against the intrusion upon petitioner's
Fourth Amendment interests resulting from the requirement.240 The Court
concluded that the governmental interest outweighed the intrusion, but
invalidating a citizen's right "to be let alone"241-a legitimate Fourth
Amendment privilege-for the purpose of law enforcement convenience
eviscerates the protections of the Fourth Amendment, contradicting
precedent and the proper conclusion of the required balancing test.
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT
The reasoning behind the Court's dismissal of petitioner's Fifth
Amendment claim was also flawed. In order to invoke the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination, a
communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.242 The
majority assumed the testimonial and compelled nature of the
communication in the present case, focusing on whether or not petitioner's
identity was incriminating.243 It held that in order for Hiibel's identity to be
incriminating, there must have been a real and appreciable danger of
incrimination as a result of being compelled to answer the officer's
inquiries, as required by Brown v. Walker.24  It concluded that in the
present case no such danger to petitioner was present, because petitioner did
not refuse to answer out of a fear, but simply "because he thought his name




241 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
242 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000).
243 See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
244 Id.; see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (internal quotations omitted).
245 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
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explanation for how his identity would have been used to convict him of
anything, as required by Hoffman v. United States.
2 46
Justice Stevens' dissent appropriately took the majority to task for this
holding.247 According to Justice Stevens, the "broad constitutional right to
remain silent" deriving from the Fifth Amendment does not allow for the
exception granted by the Nevada Legislature.248 Supreme Court precedent
supports this conclusion. In United States v. Hubbell, the Court found that
a name carries incriminating value, "even if the information itself is not
inculpatory. 249 Justice Stevens points out that if petitioner's name carried
no incriminating value-if it was of no use to the officer in the execution of
his duty or the prosecution of petitioner--"why else would the officer ask
for it? And why else would the Nevada Legislature require its disclosure
only when circumstances 'reasonably indicate that the person has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime'?" 250
This observation is damning to the majority, for it highlights an
important, perhaps fatal, inconsistency in the Court's decision. In its
analysis of petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim, the majority opinion
found that the intrusion was justified by the important governmental
interests served, including allowing an officer to determine whether the
suspect is wanted for a crime, and its corollary, allowing an officer to clear
a suspect's name, thereby relieving him of his status as suspect.251 Neither
of these possibilities was present in Hiibel's case; had he complied and
identified himself, Dove would not have discovered that Hiibel was wanted
-for a separate crime. Neither would his identity, taken alone, have served to
clear him of any wrongdoing. The Court was generalizing, making a
broader policy argument for the governmental interests at stake. This
approach is useful.
However, when the Court reached its analysis of Hiibel's Fifth
Amendment claim, it refused to generalize by considering whether one's
identity could ever be incriminating.252 The Court merely found that upon
these facts, petitioner lacked any "real and appreciable fear" of self-
246 Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)) (noting that a
communication is incriminating if it serves to "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute").
247 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000).
250 Hilbel, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting NEv. REV. STAT.
171.123(1) (2003)).
251 Id. at 2458.
252 Id. at 2461.
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incrimination, 253 and therefore a case "where there is a substantial allegation
that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a
link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual" was beyond
the scope of the present inquiry, and would be considered when it arises.
4
The Court's dance around the inescapable conclusion that Hiibel's
arrest was unconstitutional ultimately collapses under its own weight. The
majority cannot have it both ways. One conclusion drawn by the Court was
that Hiibel's identity, if revealed, would have been useful to the officer, and
thus an important governmental interest was present, thereby outweighing
the intrusion and justifying the stop for Fourth Amendment purposes. By
the same token, however, Hiibel's identity, by the very fact of its usefulness
to the police officer, must have borne incriminating worth. Either the name
"Hiibel" was useful to the Deputy Dove, or it was not. If it was useful, then
the Nevada statute compelled Hiibel to incriminate himself in violation of
his Fifth Amendment rights. If it was not useful, then there was no
governmental interest justifying the intrusion, it failed the Court's balancing
test, and was therefore a violation of Hiibel's right under the Fourth
Amendment to be secure in his person "against unreasonable searches and
91255seizures.
The Court attempted to avoid this conclusion through the rhetorical
trick of analyzing petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim in the abstract,
thereby discovering several "important governmental interests" which
justified the stop (even though none of those interests was at stake in this
case), while restricting its Fifth Amendment analysis narrowly to the facts
at hand, and concluding that Hiibel had no realistic fear of incrimination
(certainly as an abstract concept, requiring identification will often serve to
incriminate those subject to a Terry stop).256 This sleight of hand robbed




255 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
256 As a policy point with regard to the Court's Fifth Amendment analysis, the majority
seems to expect clairvoyance from the police officer on the street. How else is he to know
beforehand whether a suspect's identity will be incriminating (in which case he is in danger
of having violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, for the Court, in the present case,
declined to decide this point) or not (in which case, according to the majority, the inquiry is
constitutionally valid)?
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's conclusion in Hiibel was flawed. The application of NRS
Section 171.123-requiring the suspect of a Terry stop based on reasonable
suspicion to identify himself to a police officer or face arrest-to
petitioner's case violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The majority applied the proper test
when it sought to balance the government interests served by the inquiry
against its intrusiveness upon petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.
However, the Court reached its conclusion after a minimum of analysis, and
with little precedential basis. The majority proceeded to analyze
petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim, but in its attempt to justify the Nevada
statute under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, tied itself in its own
reasoning. For the purposes of its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court
held that important governmental interests were served by the statute's
requirements-primarily by making it easier for law enforcement to catch
and prosecute criminals. However, in its Fifth Amendment analysis, the
Court found that the communication of petitioner's identity was not
incriminating. These two holdings cannot be reconciled, and as such,
Hiibel's arrest under Section 171.123 was unconstitutional.
Robert Nederhood*
* Thank you to my wife Maria for her patience and support and to the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology editorial staff for their thoughtful suggestions.
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